This new edition of Aristotle s De interpretatione provides an improved text compared to the 1949 Oxford edition, based upon an evaluation of the seven earliest surviving medieval manuscripts as well as many translations and commentaries from late antiquity. A text-critical apparatus provides information about the different readings.".

Aristotle's treatise De Interpretatione is one of his central works; it continues to be the focus of much attention and debate. C. W. A. Whitaker presents the first systematic study of this work, and offers a radical new view of its aims, its structure, and its place in Aristotle's system, basing this view upon a detailed chapter-by-chapter analysis.By treating the work systematically, rather than concentrating on certain selected passages, Whitaker is able to show that, contrary to traditional opinion, it (...) forms an organized and coherent whole. He argues that the De Interpretatione is intended to provide the underpinning for dialectic, the system of argument by question and answer set out in Aristotle's Topics; and he rejects the traditional view that the De Interpretatione concerns the assertion and is oriented towards the formal logic of the Prior Analytics. In doing so, he sheds valuable new light on some of Aristotle's most famous texts. (shrink)

"De interpretatione" from Aristoteles. Aristotle (384-322 BCE) was a Greek philosopher born in Greece.

Edition of the commentary on Aristotle's De interpretatione by an anonymous Parisian master from the first half of the 13th century.

Both the title of this treatise and its traditional placement as the second of Aristotle's logical writings are highly misleading. What, on the one hand, De Interpretatione deals with is not, as its title suggests, a theory of interpretation, but rather a theory of statement-making sentences of different sorts and the logical relations that obtain between them; and what, on the other hand, this theory aims at is not, as suggested by the place which De Interpretatione traditionally occupies (...) in the Organon between the Categories and the Prior Analytics, providing preliminaries to the study of syllogistic by analyzing statement-making sentences as possible parts of syllogisms, but rather underpinning the study of dialectical debates by examining such sentences as possible members of contradictory pairs. Among other things, De Interpretatione deals with symbols or signs, truth, bivalence, determinism, modal logic, and modal statements. (shrink)

Aristotle Categoriae et Liber de Interpretatione.

ABSTRACT: In this paper I show that, contrary to the prevalent view, in his De Interpretatione chapter 8, Aristotle is concerned with a kind of ambiguity, i.e. with homonymy; more precisely, with homonymy of linguistic expressions as it may occur in dialectical argument. The paper has two parts. In the first part, I argue that in the Sophistici Elenchi 175b39-176a5 Aristotle indubitably deals with homonymy in dialectical argument; that De Interpretatione 8 is a parallel to Sophistici Elenchi 175b39-176a5; (...) that De Interpretatione 8 is concerned with dialectical argument; that, hence, De Interpretatione 8, too, deals with homonymy in dialectical argument. In the second part I discuss objections that have been put forward against the view that De Interpretatione 8 is about homonymy and demonstrate that they do not succeed. (shrink)

Aristotle, in De Interpretatione, only briefly suggests the distinction between compound nouns and nominal phrases. However, late ancient commentators provide more extensive analysis. My goal is to clarify their views, arguing that a common strategy among them is to demonstrate how compounds and nominal phrases contribute differently to the truth-conditions of declarative sentences. Nonetheless, I insist that the primary value of examining these commentators lies in avoiding certain anachronisms related to compounds. Specifically, Aristotle is not puzzled by the difference (...) between compounds and nominal phrases in the way we might be today. Instead, he uses compounds as convenient linguistic items serving a theoretical role in an a fortiori argument, establishing fundamental linguistic principles: that words are basic units of signification and that compositional meaning is a prerequisite for truth-value. (shrink)

In De Interpretatione 6-9, Aristotle considers three logical principles: the principle of bivalence, the law of excluded middle, and the rule of contradictory pairs (according to which of any contradictory pair of statements, exactly one is true and the other false). Surprisingly, Aristotle accepts none of these without qualification. I offer a coherent interpretation of these chapters as a whole, while focusing special attention on two sorts of statements that are of particular interest to Aristotle: universal statements not made (...) universally and future particular statements. With respect to the former, I argue that Aristotle takes them to be indeterminate and so to violate the rule of contradictory pairs. With respect to the latter, the subject of the much discussed ninth chapter, I argue that the rule of contradictory pairs, and not the principle of bivalence, is the focus of Aristotle's refutation. Nevertheless, Aristotle rejects bivalence for future particular statements. (shrink)

In De interpretatione 9, Aristotle argues against the fatalist view that if statements about future contingent singular events (e.g. ‘There will be a sea battle tomorrow,’ ‘There will not be a sea battle tomorrow’) are already true or false, then the events to which those statements refer will necessarily occur or necessarily not occur. Scholars have generally held that, to refute this argument, Aristotle allows that future contingent statements are exempt from either the principle of bivalence, or the law (...) of excluded middle. This paper offers a new interpretation of Aristotle’s refutation of fatalism. According to this interpretation, each member of a pair of contradictory future contingent statements, in virtue of expressing modal necessity, is simply false. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: In this paper I show that, contrary to the prevalent view, in his De Interpretatione chapter 8, Aristotle is concerned with a kind of ambiguity, i.e. with homonymy; more precisely, with homonymy of linguistic expressions as it may occur in dialectical argument. The paper has two parts. In the first part, I argue that in the Sophistici Elenchi 175b39-176a5 Aristotle indubitably deals with homonymy in dialectical argument; that De Interpretatione 8 is a parallel to Sophistici Elenchi 175b39-176a5; (...) that De Interpretatione 8 is concerned with dialectical argument; that, hence, De Interpretatione 8, too, deals with homonymy in dialectical argument. In the second part I discuss objections that have been put forward against the view that De Interpretatione 8 is about homonymy and demonstrate that they do not succeed. (shrink)

It is generally agreed that Aristotle’s aim in De Interpretatione 9 is to rebut arguments purporting to show that bivalence entails fatalism. But the nature of his rebuttal is controversial. Some have argued that Aris- totle accepts the arguments as valid and responds by limiting biva- lence; others have argued that he accepts unlimited bivalence and responds by showing the arguments to be invalid. This paper develops and defends a novel version of the latter view, one which diverges from (...) extant varieties in four main ways. First, it shows that there is good reason to view the chapter’s opening sentences as revealing a commitment to unlimited bivalence. Second, it argues that Aristotle rejects the fatalist arguments on the grounds that they equivocate bet- ween two distinct senses of necessity – absolute and hypothetical. Third, it explains the distinction between the two senses of necessity as deriving from their different explanatory bases. Fourth, it describes the distinct ways in which the two forms of necessity apply to states of affairs and assertions. The paper concludes by discussing the fatalist arguments and how Aristotle’s criticism applies to them. (shrink)

Some authors have talken about the problem of the future contingents Aristotle exposed in De Interpretatione IX. But most of them do not explain the role of that chapter in his own work. Last analysis always try to find a formal solution. And this is very significative because De Interpretatione is a treatise that belongs to the semantic of the Organon. In this article we show that: 1. The aim of the problem of future contigents is not only (...) formal and the frame of the Aristotle’s solution. 2. Its implication with others important concepts in his philosophy like “substance”, “truth” and “dialectics”. (shrink)

One can sympathize with [Leo] Strauss' ultimate aim—to protect the validity of moral judgment against that form of relativism which would assess the value of great philosophic works simply in terms of how they satisfied the needs of the times for which they were written. But in believing that "historicism " meant "relativism," and that all attention to the temporal relevance of great doctrines in the history of ideas was somehow perverse, Strauss was profoundly mistaken. Hermeneutics is not axiology. Questions (...) of truth and validity are fundamental, but they are dependent upon a prior solution of the problem of meaning. And for the establishment of meaning, contextual analysis is crucial. For it is not as if ideas were the ghostly inhabitants of another world, logically cut off from human purposes and intentions. All three things exist: ideas, agents, and social contexts, and the best history of ideas is, I believe, constituted by the careful consideration of the multiple interrelationships between them. It is false to believe that texts exhaust their own meaning. For there is always an historical grounding and a web of person and social events that give them wider and deeper significance. And this is precisely why we must ask such questions as: What sort of society was the author writing for and trying to persuade? What were the conventions of communication and the literary forms of discourse current at the time? What was the author's class affiliation, his place in the social hierarchy of his age? And perhaps above all: What were his moral commitments, the structure of his ideals? Albert William Levi, David May Distinguished University Professor of the Humanities at Washington University, Saint Louis, is the author of Philosophy and the Modern World; Literature, Philosophy and the Imagination; Humanism and Politics; and Philosophy as Social Expression, and The Idea of Culture. His "Culture: A Guess at the Riddle" appeared in Critical Inquiry, Winter 1977. (shrink)

"Este libro tiene como tema la doctrina del juicio predicativo según Aristóteles. Resume en cierta manera la enseñanza y la investigación sobre dicho tema a lo largo de varios años. Parte ha sido ya expresado de algún modo en congresos o publicaciones. En este libro el capítulo en torno al cual gira todo el resto es el destinado a Aristóteles, específicamente a De interpretatione. Los restantes capítulos están destinados a los comentaristas más relevantes de dicho texto de Aristóteles, como (...) son Amonio Hermida y Boecio, quienes dan cuenta de interpretaciones desaparecidas. Entre los restantes de hallan Alberto Magno y Tomás de Aquino hasta Suárez. En lo que concierne a la recepción contemporánea de Aristóteles, se da cuenta de Husserl, quien en su doctrina del juicio desarrollada en sus investigaciones lógicas, se remite a De interpretatione de Aristóteles. En esta línea se tocan dos puntos en discusión, uno de los cuales es la nueva interpretación de la doctrina del juicio que se inicia a partir de Duns Escoto u Ockham, quienes la asientan en sus propias interpretaciones de la doctrina de Aristóteles, y que perdura hasta Frege. Otro de los puntos en discusión que se aborda es el de la exclusión del ámbito de la verdad de las oraciones prácticas, en De interpretatione. La resolución de ambos puntos en discusión que aquí se propone se aborda desde la interpretación de Husserl de la doctrina aristotélica; sin dejar de tener presente la posición de Austin y Searle".--. (shrink)

The article investigates the treatment of modality in chapters 12 and 13 of De Interpretatione and gives a new interpretation of the puzzling table of modals to be found at the beginning of chapter 13, as well as dealing with some of Aristotle’s puzzles. This is achieved by extending Aristotle’s distinction between two senses of possibility, which (following Ackrill) I call ‘one-sided’ and ‘two-sided’, to the two notions of necessity and impossibility. The conclusion is reached that, while the two (...) notions of necessity and impossibility are logically incompatible when both are taken as one-sided, in their two-sided senses they are in fact equivalent. (shrink)

It is said that all philosophy is nothing other than a commentary on Plato.Maybe.But was not Plato himself a commentary on Parmenides, Heraclitus, the Pythagoreans, and the Sophists, not to mention Socrates?And conversely, too, the Commentary on Aristotle composed by St Thomas was not the personal philosophy of Thomas Aquinas? Or then again, do Proclus’ Commentarii in primum Euclidis Elementorum librum not embody a new and original neoplatonic philosophy of mathematics?

The XIIIth meeting of the Symposium Aristotelicum, which took place in 1993 on the De Interpretatione, had a very strange and very sad history. True enough, it took place in the enchanting decor of the Certosa di Pontignano, near Siena ; and, as usual, it offered contributions and discussions of the highest order. But this time the publication of the papers met with insurmountable obstacles. It had been initially entrusted to Mario Mignucci and Michael Frede, two of the most (...) faithful and devoted participants in the Symposium. Most infortunately, however, they were both wrenched from our admiration and affection, Mario Mignucci in 2004, after a protracted and merciless disease, Michael Frede in 2007, owing to an unpredictable, sudden accident. The inevitable ensuing delay for the publication of the XIIIth Symposium has not been caught up with so far and those members of the Organization Committee whom I have been able to contact told me that, in their opinion, it ran a strong risk of never being caught up at all, alas. By a moving coincidence (at least for me), no more than three weeks before Michael’s death, my colleague and friend, Professor Thomas De Koninck, had asked me if I would agree to publish the present paper in the Laval théologique et philosophique. Thomas and his collaborators Paul Asselin and Martin Achard helped me to finally overcome my scruples ; I am deeply grateful to them. As for this long paper itself, it would be difficult to summarize it : it is, or tries to be, exactly what it looks like, namely a detailed reading of Ammonius’ commentary to the famous Chapter One of the De Interpretatione. If this reading has any dose of originality, it will be due not so much to the lights the ancient commentary may shed (or not shed) on the letter and the interpretation of the Aristotelician text as to what it may teach concerning the methods, selections, and intellectual behaviour of its author himself, as well as with regard to his own philosophical and pedagogical reactions before such a text as Aristotle’s own. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Aristotle’s “De Interpretatione”: Contradiction and Dialectic by C. W. A. WhitakerEugene GarverC. W. A. Whitaker, Aristotle’s “De Interpretatione”: Contradiction and Dialectic. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. Pp. x + 235. Cloth, $60.00.Traditionally, the De Interpretatione is placed in the Organon between the Categories and the Prior Analytics. Where the Categories is about single terms and the Analytics about inferences, the De Interpretatione is about propositions. (...) That traditional view is presupposed by most contemporary studies of the work, which “concentrate on a small number of passages, which have been treated as isolated oases of philosophical interest in an otherwise barren work,” highlights which include “Aristotle’s semantic theory of philosophy of language” in the first chapter, the first four “linguistic chapters,” and chapter 9 on the Sea Battle (1). I suppose that the square of opposition could be added to Whitaker’s list.Whitaker, in this republication of a doctoral dissertation, wants to challenge both the traditional view and the contemporary concentration by instead studying the work as a coherent whole, whose subject, it turns out, is not propositions after all but “contradictory pairs, which are central to the working of dialectic” (2). The book then proceeds through the De Interpretatione, chapter by chapter. If he succeeds, the De Interpretatione will henceforth be read as preparation for the Topics, rather than for the Analytics. There are also three appendices examining the use of such contradictory pairs in Metaphysics IV, the Topics, and the Posterior Analytics.Thus, the first five chapters of the De Interpretatione explain the nature of assertions, name and verb, and “before that, how language is related to thought and to the real world, and how it is that utterances can make claims about things which are true or false” (8). Where names, verbs, and propositions are part of our ordinary understanding of language, contradictory pairs are not, but are a philosophical understanding of a linguistic structure that has a specifically philosophical, dialectical, purpose. The rest of the De Interpretatione, from chapter 6 on, is the examination of contradiction. Chapters 7–9 classify contradictory pairs by different criteria. Each of these chapters isolates an exception to “the rule that, in every contradictory pair, one member is true and the other false” (79). Chapter 7 looks at the first exception to the rule, “non-universal statements about universals” (91). Whitaker’s project looks good here, since he then shows the dialectical uses of such propositions, and denies their value for the deductive logic of the Analytics. Similarly, in Chapter 8 Aristotle looks at “apparently simple assertions... which are not single” (105), which also have important uses in dialectic. Finally, chapter 9 looks at the third exception to the rule, future singular assertions. One payoff of this book is to place the sea battle discussion in its Aristotelian context. [End Page 459] Whitaker says that most discussions of the sea battle assume that what is at stake is what he calls the “Principle of Bivalence” in which every assertion is either true or false. He instead insists that it is contradictory pairs, not single assertions, that are being tested by future contingents. He thus concludes: “Dialectic is a universal discipline, and its questioning can cover any subject where a question can be posed which has a right and a wrong answer. Chapters 7 to 9... demonstrate that there are limits to the universality of dialectic” (128).Whitaker follows the De Interpretatione chapter by chapter in the remainder of the book. He shows how the later chapters assist the dialectician in “sorting assertions into contradictory pairs” (181). And just as De Interpretatione begins with a consideration of the relation of language, thought, and the world, so it ends by showing the connection between contradictory propositions and opposed beliefs.Whitaker rarely strays from the De Interpretatione to show how our understanding of dialectic is improved by attention to this prerequisite. When he does, for example in a very short discussion of the relation of problems and propositions in the Topics, the results are illuminating. I would have liked more. This book should be useful to the growing numbers of scholars interested in Aristotle’s art of dialectic... (shrink)

This update to the award-winning first edition analyzes the pros and cons of different media and focuses on general guidelines and basic principles, making the ideas in this guide transferable to future technologies.

Regarding the famous Sea Battle Argument, which Aristotle presents in De Interpretatione 9, there has never been a general agreement not only about its correctness but also, and mainly, about what the argument really is. According to the most natural reading of the chapter, the argument appeals to a temporal concept of truth and concludes that not every statement is always either true or false. However, many of Aristotle’s followers and commentators have not adopted this reading. I believe that (...) it has faced so much resistance for reasons of hermeneutic charity: denying the law of universal bivalence seems to be overly disruptive to logical orthodoxy – the kind of logical orthodoxy represented by what we now call classical propositional logic, much of which Aristotle clearly supports in many texts. I intend to show that the logical-semantic theses that the traditional reading finds in De Interpretatione 9 are much more conservative than they may seem to be at first glance. First, I will show that they complement, and do not contradict in any way, the orthodox definitions of the concepts of truth and statement that Aristotle advances in other texts. Second, by resorting in an anachronistic vein to concepts and methods peculiar to contemporary logic, I will show that a trivalent modal semantics conforming to those theses can be built for a standard formal language of the classical propositional calculus. It is remarkable that reasonable concepts of logical truth and logical consequence that may be defined on the basis of this trivalent modal semantics are coextensive with their orthodox counterparts, the concepts of tautology and tautological consequence of classical bivalent and extensional semantics. (shrink)

Aristotle Categoriae et Liber de Interpretatione.

Resumen: En De interpretatione Aristóteles distingue entre voces articuladas e inarticuladas. Mientras que la voz articulada se compone de una combinación de vocales y consonantes, la voz inarticulada equivale a cualquier sonido emitido por animales no humanos. Sin embargo, al-Fārābī cuestiona esta visión. En su Gran Comentario a De Interpretatione, corrige la postura de Aristóteles y desarrolla una argumentación que toma en cuenta algunas consideraciones sobre el comportamiento de los animales no humanos en algunos de los tratados de (...) Aristóteles sobre los animales. Tras presentar la postura de al-Fārābī en torno al "lenguaje" en los animales no humanos, discuto brevemente hasta qué punto las capacidades de los animales no humanos para expresarse y comunicarse amplían nuestra comprensión de lo que podríamos entender por lenguaje.: In De Interpretatione Aristotle distinguishes between articulate and inarticulate voices. While articulate voices are a combination of vowels and consonants, inarticulate voices would be any sound uttered by non-human animals. Nevertheless, al-Fārābī debated this view. In his Long Commentary on the De Interpretatione, he amends Aristotle's position and develops an argumentation that takes into account some considerations regarding nonhuman animals' behavior found in Aristotle's treatises on animals. After presenting al-Fārābī's views concerning the "language" of non-human animals, I briefly discuss to what extent the capacities of non-human animals to express and communicate themselves broadens our comprehension of what we might understand by language. (shrink)

"The central theme of the De interpretatione is the nature of contradiction between assertions. This is a crucially important theme for dialectic, whose regular tasks include that of establishing the contradictory of a proposed thesis, and that of replying to a dilemmatic question by choosing between the affirmation and the negation of a given thesis.(4) The inquiry into language as such, which occupies the first four chapters, is subordinated to this goal. One apparent obstacle to such a view of (...) the treatise is the (highly suspect). (shrink)

In De Interpretatione 9 Aristotle considers the proposition that everything that is or comes to be, is or comes to be of necessity. From the supposition that this is so, he draws the following consequence: ‘[In that case] there would be no need to deliberate or take trouble, [saying] that if we do this there will be so and so, and if we do not do this there will not be so and so’. Finding this result absurd, he rejects (...) the supposition and concludes that some events or states of affairs are contingent. (shrink)

Ce volume inaugure l'édition française de l'ensemble de l'activité exégétique d'Averroès sur la somme logique qu'est l' " Organon " aristotélicien. On trouvera, accompagnées de l'annotation essentielle, les oeuvres d'Averroès sur le traité " De l'interprétation ", où Aristote établit la doctrine de la proposition simple et de ses éléments constitutifs.

Boethius represents one of the most important milestones in Christian reflection about fate and providence, especially considering that he takes into account Proclus’ contributions to these questions. For this reason, The Consolation of philosophy is considered a crucial work for the development of this topic. However, Boethius also exposes his ideas in his commentary on the book that constitutes one of the oldest and most relevant texts on the problem of future contingents, namely Aristotle’s De interpretatione. Although St. Thomas (...) refers to Boethius many times in his systematic works and even devotes two commentaries to two of his theological opuscules, it is of special interest that both authors composed a commentary on the abovementioned work by Aristotle. The commentary of Saint Thomas does not interpret the whole book, but it does study the pages about future contingents in dialogue with Boethius. We will study such texts in our presentation. They constitute one of the greatest contributions of Aquinas to the problem of necessity and contingency and therefore to the vexata quaestio of divine intervention in the world and particularly in human free will. Not only Augustin but also Aristotle (read by Boethius) and Nemesius of Emesa will be decisive in Aquinas’ perception of this matter. (shrink)

This article considers three medieval approaches to the problem of future contingent propositions in chapter 9 of Aristotle's _De interpretatione_. While Boethius assumed that God's atemporal knowledge infallibly pertains to historical events, he was inclined to believe that Aristotle correctly taught that future contingent propositions are not antecedently true or false, even though they may be characterized as true-or-false. Aquinas also tried to combine the allegedly Aristotelian view of the disjunctive truth-value of future contingent propositions with the conception of all (...) things being timelessly present to God's knowledge. The second approach was formulated by Peter Abelard who argued that in Aristotle's view future contingent propositions are true or false, not merely true-or-false, and that the antecedent truth of future propositions does not necessitate things in the world. After Duns Scotus, many late medieval thinkers thought like Abelard, particularly because of their new interpretation of contingency, but they did not believe, with the exception of John Buridan, that this was an Aristotelian view. (shrink)

In his detailed and well-argued study of the De interpretatione, Whitaker shows that the treatise is a coherent whole and is closely linked to the Topics and the Sophistici Elenchi, rather than to the Categories and the Prior Analytics as tradition has it. Convinced of the dialectical character of the book he rejects the title as spurious. It should be περὶ ἀντιφάσεως. In the first chapter Whitaker defends the reading πρώτων in 16a8 and explains that falsehood is stating as (...) one things which are in reality separated from each other, or as separate things which are one. Next he deals with the analysis of nouns and verbs. Departing from Alexander, he is right in holding that only man has speech. Animals can show something but do not signify it. The difficult sentence “being by itself is nothing” is understood as follows: being represents the combination of subject and predicate in an assertion. By itself it is nothing, but when used as a copula it gets an additional signification. However, I do not think that this understanding of προσημαίνειν is correct. In the interpretation of Whitaker, the text should simply say “it gets a meaning” without the “additional.” On this point one may usefully compare the commentary by St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Perihermeneias, lesson 5, which reviews the various options. The verb “to be” alone does not signify that something is, but it denotes pure actuality. (shrink)

In the first part of De Interpretatione 9, Aristotle introduces an argument for fatalism that he obviously does not subscribe to. Readers of the chapter wonder how Aristotle replies to that argument. In this paper I claim that the main basis of his reply is the principle of equimodality stated in 19a33 (“statements are true in the same way as the actual things are”). I defend that this principle should be interpreted in the most straightforward way, as saying that (...) the modality with which any statement is true is the same as the modality with which the actual things referred to in the statement are what they are. This entails that something is (or will be) necessarily such and such only if the statement saying that it is (or will be) such and such is necessarily true. By applying this principle to Aristotle’s distinction between two kinds of non-necessary things – those that happen as chance has it and those that happen for the most part (hôs epi to poly) in one way rather than another –, one should conclude that, because these things are contingent, statements about them can only be contingently true. (shrink)

Modern logicians have complained that Aristotelian logic lacks a distinction between predication and assertion, and that predication, according to the Aristotelians, implies assertion. The present paper addresses the question of whether this criticism can be levelled against Aristotle’s logic. Based on a careful study of the De interpretatione, the paper shows that even if Aristotle defines what he calls simple assertion in terms of predication, he does not confound predication and assertion. That is because, first, he does not understand (...) compound assertion in terms of predication, and secondly, he acknowledges non-assertive predicative thoughts that are truth-evaluable. Therefore, the implications of Aristotle’s ‘predication theory of assertion’ are not as devastating as the critics believe. (shrink)